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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROSECUTE AND THE ICC: A PROBLEMATIC 
RELATIONSHIP? 
ABSTRACT. The article addresses the links between the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the implications of their developments in the 
context of Libya and Syria. R2P as well as the ICC focus on the idea that sovereignty has 
evolved from being an absolute right towards including responsibility towards a state’s own 
citizens. This idea was applied in the case of Libya where military as well as judicial 
intervention was supported by R2P language but intervention in Syria to stop human rights 
abuses in a similar vein is not forthcoming. The article focuses primarily on the 
Responsibility to Prosecute in these two cases. The principles of ending impunity and holding 
individuals accountable for their actions are not questioned by the international society, but 
the main problem is how this can be done in a politically sustainable way. Security Council 
referral doesn’t seem to be the best option because too close ties with the Council will lead to 
the ICC becoming a politicised tool, moving further away from what it was designed to do: 
enforcing justice principles universally and impartially.   
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the links between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the implications of their developments in the context of 
Libya and Syria. R2P is a consolidating norm in international society that takes account of the 
fact that states have a responsibility towards human beings in times of crises. Both concepts 
focus on the idea that sovereignty has evolved from being an absolute right towards 
sovereignty including responsibility towards a state’s own citizens. The primary 
responsibility to protect a state’s citizens lies with the state itself but should that state be 
unwilling or unable to do so, then the international community needs to step in and take on 
that responsibility. This idea has developed over the years and is institutionalised in R2P 
through a three pillar structure and similarly in the ICC through the principle of 
complementarity. The idea was applied in the case of Libya where military as well as judicial 
intervention was supported by R2P language. 
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Following criticisms over NATO’s involvement in Libya and the civilian protection mandate 
that eventually resulted in regime change, a number of states became less supportive of R2P. 
Subsequent vetoes in the Security Council on resolutions that would have supported 
intervention in the Syrian crisis were based more on principle rather than substantive 
disagreements about the crisis itself. China and Russia in particular (but not exclusively) 
opposed invoking R2P as a smokescreen to legitimise regime change. This has also affected 
the ICC’s ability to intervene in the conflict with judicial means. This article argues that for 
this and a number of other reasons, the ICC does not benefit from being too closely 
associated with R2P and military intervention. It is not a powerful mechanism for stopping 
ongoing violence and it risks becoming too much of a political tool, harmed by geopolitical 
struggles in the Security Council.  
The principles of ending impunity and holding individuals accountable for their actions are 
not questioned by the international society, a clear Responsibility to Prosecute seems to exist, 
but the question is how this can be done in a politically sustainable way. Security Council 
referral doesn’t seem to be the best option for this. Too close ties with the Council will lead 
to the ICC becoming a politicised tool, moving further away from what it was designed to do 
– to be instrument for universal and impartial enforcement of justice principles. 
 
II. THE ICC AND R2P 
Intervention in other state’s affairs to protect human rights has been discussed in international 
relations for a long time. Predominantly centred on controversies surrounding humanitarian 
intervention, i.e. the intervention with military force to protect human rights in another state, 
the international community was trying to establish guidelines to ensure consistent 
application. As has been well documented elsewhere, in 2000, the International Commission 
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) acknowledged that external military 
intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it happened – 
as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and when it failed to happen, as in Rwanda. It tried to 
deal with some of these issues and also proposed establishing criteria for intervention in 
another state’s internal affairs that go beyond mere use of force.  
 
The ‘responsibility to protect’ is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophes, such as mass murder, rape, starvation. 
Sovereignty is not just a right, but it also carries obligations such as a primary responsibility 
towards the state’s own citizens 
 
2.1. R2P in Practice  
The question is how well this works in practice. The ICISS report was written just before 
September 11, 2001 and the situation has changed considerably. States are very reluctant to 
intervene in another state’s internal affairs and the main emphasis has shifted towards 
counterterrorism rather than concerns for human rights as a whole. Even though the ICISS 
report enjoys widespread support in general by civil society, different UN institutions and a 
number of governments, there are problems with the report’s implementation. There is a lack 
of operational capacity and the political will of parties that would have the capacities to 
intervene. There was always concern that the ICISS report could be used as an excuse to 
legitimate any form of intervention even if the motives are not humanitarian in nature. The 
intervention in Libya (discussed below) can be seen as a case in point where the protection of 
civilians turned to regime change. However, the situation in Darfur shows the other extreme: 
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it is a textbook example of a government that is ‘unable or unwilling’ (R2P language) to 
protect its citizens, but the international response has been rather weak. 
 
R2P has no legal significance as it is not legally binding in international law. As Garwood-
Gowers argues, R2P presents a “political or moral commitment by states” 1  to establish 
existing duties. R2P is a normative concept that confers powers to international institutions. It 
is a norm in the process of consolidating that is no longer questioned in content; the main 
disagreements surround questions of means, of how R2P can be implemented. The doctrine’s 
normative language functions as political tool with the aim of changing behaviour.  As 
Chesterman argues, “the true significance of RtoP is not creating new rights or obligations to 
do “the right thing”; rather, it is making harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all.”2  
 
2.2. R2P and ICC – linkages and parallels 
The ICC is linked to and has parallels with R2P in a number of ways. In the Secretary-
General’s 2009 ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ report, the ICC is mentioned 
under pillar 1: “the responsibilities to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of State 
responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of populations is a 
defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first century.” The aim is to 
“build responsible sovereignty, not undermine it.” 3 In order to assist states in being able to 
protect human rights within their borders, the report suggests that –as a first step - states 
should become part of international institutions that deal with human rights and humanitarian 
                                                          
1Andrew Garwood-Gowers 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as 
the Norm?' (2013) 36 UNSW Law Journal 600  
2Simon Chesterman '"Leading from Behind": The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Libya' (2011) 25 Ethics & International Affairs 282  
3Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (General Assembly  Sixty-third session 2009) 10  
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law, such as the ICC. The report further argues that “By seeking to end impunity, the 
International Criminal Court and the United Nations-assisted tribunals have added an 
essential tool for implementing the responsibility to protect.” The report calls the ICC “one of 
the key instruments relating to the responsibility to protect”4 It stresses the importance of 
individual accountability as a crucial aspect of the ICC’s deterrence effect that aims to 
prevent mass atrocities from occurring, underlining R2P’s clear emphasis on prevention as 
the most important aspect of its framework. 
 
The ICC is again mentioned under pillar 3 (timely and decisive response). “Sovereignty does 
not bestow impunity on those who organize, incite or commit crimes relating to the 
responsibility to protect. (…) such acts could be referred to the International Criminal Court, 
under the Rome Statute.”5 This shows that the ICC is seen as a part of R2P or at least as part 
of the toolkit available under the concept. Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, 
called the Court as much6 through its role of fighting impunity for some of the most serious 
crimes. 
 
Both, R2P and the ICC Statute share a number of key assumptions and provisions. Both call 
for human rights and humanitarian concerns to be of international concern and make clear 
moral cases in favour of a responsibility of the international community to hold those 
responsible for atrocities to account. They both limit their scope to only a few crimes that are 
seen to be of utmost concern to humanity as a whole: war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. For both, the main question remains to be the one of the means – how can 
                                                          
4Ibid. 
5Ibid.  
6Fatou Bensouda, 'Closing Keynote Address' (Atrocity Reporting and the Responsibility to Protect, New York 
2012)   
7 
 
those responsible be held to account? In national or international procedures? And how can 
such crimes be prevented?  
 
R2P sets out in both, pillar 1 and pillar 3, that the primary responsibility to deal with crimes 
rests with the state in question. The ICC has a similar provision in its complementarity 
principle (Article 17 of the Rome Statute) that also ensures that the first responsibility to act 
lies with the affected state. The ICC can only act if the state is genuinely unwilling or unable 
to act itself and bring alleged perpetrators of the most serious human rights abuses to justice. 
R2P places its greatest emphasis on prevention as the key strategy to avoid humanitarian 
disasters from taking place. Similarly, the ICC focusses on its possible deterrence effect of 
criminal prosecutions, i.e. the notion that holding individuals accountable for their actions 
sends a clear signal and therefore prevents future crimes from happening.  
 
The Security Council can refer situations to the ICC under its Chapter VII powers. Even 
though the rationale for using the ICC as a ‘standing court’ rather than having to create new 
ad hoc ones is compelling for a number of practical reasons, this is also very problematic 
because it politicises the ICC that is then perceived to be an extension of the Security 
Council. The ICC was intended to be largely independent from the UN and the Security 
Council, but if it is being used as a tool by an inherently political body such as the Security 
Council, this perception of independence is being lost which ultimately undermines the 
Court’s credibility and legitimacy.  
 
The main difference between the two is that R2P is a political concept whereas the ICC is a 
legal institution. This mismatch makes linking the two problematic – especially for the ICC. 
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R2P can call on the ICC as an international institution, but the ICC does not benefit from a 
too close association with R2P because as Schiff rightly argues: “R2P hinges on international 
political mobilization, the ICC depends upon legal judgment. Exponents of R2P might be 
charged with ineffectiveness, bias or hypocrisy but not politicization because its judgements 
are inherently political. The ICC can be charged with ineffectiveness, bias, hypocrisy and 
politicization because it’s not supposed to make decisions on a political basis.”7  
 
These difficulties became apparent during the crises in Libya and Syria that both impacted on 
R2P and the ICC: in Libya, the ICC was called to act under R2P and similar but hitherto 
unsuccessful proposals were made in the case of Syria.  
 
III. THE RESPONSE TO LIBYA  
The crisis in Libya came quite suddenly and was fairly unexpected by world leaders.8 Libya 
was ruled by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who came into power in 1969 by overthrowing the 
King in a coup. His 42-year autocratic rule came to an end in February 2011 when the Libyan 
people engaged in a popular uprising against Gaddafi, inspired by anti-authoritarian protests 
that swept the Arab world in what came to be known as the Arab Spring. Gaddafi reacted by 
declaring war on the protesters and violently supressing the uprising. It is estimated that 
thousands of people died in the uprising. He called those that were organising against him in 
the city of Benghazi ‘cockroaches’ and vowed to hunt them down ‘door to door’ to execute 
them. This sounded very similar to language that had been used in Rwanda at the start of its 
genocide in 1994 and compelled the international community to no longer ignore what was 
                                                          
7Benjamin Schiff, 'The ICC and R2P: Problems of individual culpability and state responsibility' ( International 
Studies Association Annual Meeting, Montreal 2011 of Conference) 8  
8See for instance Alex Bellamy 'Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm' (2011) 25 
Ethics & International Affairs   
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happening. On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1970, referring the situation in Libya to the ICC.  
 
On 17 March 2011, the Security Council approved ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians (Resolution 1973 (2011)). The Resolution 
called for robust and prompt action to protect Libya’s people from Gaddafi. This was the first 
time that the Security Council authorised military action against a functioning state for 
human protection purposes. (Bellamy, 2011, p. 263). This was also the first time the concept 
of the "responsibility to protect" was used by various UN agencies and the Security Council 
to condemn Gaddafi and impose a no-fly zone over his country. These references to R2P 
have been overemphasised by some authors,9 but they are nevertheless existent. It was the 
first time the international community explicitly used R2P as a concept to intervene in a 
conflict, with both Security Council resolutions making references to R2P.   
 
3.1.Referral to the ICC: Resolution 1970 
Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 26 February 2011. The 
Resolution was ground-breaking in that it referred the situation in Libya to the ICC 
unanimously and with reference to R2P. It stated that the Libyan authorities had a 
“responsibility to protect its population” and that states had a responsibility to intervene 
should Libya fail to do so. States in the Security Council reiterated their disapproval of the 
Libyan authorities using force against its own population. It was argued that “the widespread 
                                                          
9As argued for instance by Justin Morris 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum' 
(2013) 89 International Affairs   
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and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the 
civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.”10  
 
It is interesting to note that the Resolution was passed in the midst of an ongoing conflict, 
attempting to utilise the Court as a tool to end the fighting. There was a strong emphasis on 
the ICC’s deterrence effect and attempts to utilise the Court to stop the crisis. India, for 
instance, referred to this by arguing that “we note that several members of the Council, 
including our colleagues from Africa and the Middle East, believe that referral to the Court 
would have the effect of an immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of calm and 
stability.” 11  During this crisis, the ICC was seen as an instrument to achieve peace by 
dispensing justice in the crisis situation.  
 
States in the Security Council emphasised the need for accountability and linked it to state 
leaders’ responsibilities towards their own citizens. The US, for instance, argued that 
“Libya’s leaders will be held accountable for violating these rights and for failing to meet 
their most basic responsibilities to their people.” 12  And France similarly reiterated the 
importance of the ICC in this endeavour: “Today, faced with the atrocities we have seen, 
impunity is no longer an option. The International Criminal Court in this matter once again 
finds justification for its existence.”13 
 
                                                          
10Security Council 'Record of 6491st Security Council Meeting' 26 February 2011   
11Ibid.  
12Ibid.  
13Ibid.  
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Controversially, however, similar to Resolution 1593 (2005) that had referred Darfur to the 
ICC, Resolution 1970 exempted nationals of non-states parties (other than Libyan nationals) 
from the ICC’s jurisdiction in this case. This concession had to be made in order to get 
support from the US, China and Russia who were otherwise very likely to have vetoed the 
Resolution. This exemption was met with some criticism. For instance, Brazil stated that it 
opposed such an exemption, arguing that “initiatives aimed at establishing exemptions of 
certain categories of individuals from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are 
not helpful to advancing the cause of justice and accountability and will not contribute to 
strengthening the role of the Court.”14 As will be argued below, such exemptions are harmful 
to the institutional setup of the ICC as they go against the Court’s aim to provide impartial 
justice that is fair to all.  
 
Crucially, Resolution 1970 also included a paragraph that expressed the readiness of the 
Security Council to take further appropriate steps should Libya not comply with the terms of 
the resolution, paving the way for Resolution 1973. 
 
3.2.Civilian Protection: Resolution 1973 
Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011 with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions 
(China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil). The Resolution was heavily supported by the 
Arab League and the African Union, two regional actors in favour of international action. The 
text of the Resolution made clear that action was taken under Chapter VII with the primary 
aim of protecting civilians and achieving a ceasefire.   
 
                                                          
14Ibid.  
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The Resolution authorised the Security Council to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect 
civilians and also to impose no-fly zones that could be enforced by NATO. The Resolution 
again used R2P language by reiterating the notion that it was Libya’s primary responsibility 
to protect its own people. This was the first time R2P language was used to actually condemn 
Gaddafi and impose a no-fly zone over his country. In statements following the vote, a 
number of states referred to Libya’s responsibility towards its own people. Even though a 
number of states argued that “Libya was not fulfilling the “international responsibility of 
protecting its population,”15 the Council was divided on a number of issues with respect to 
Resolution 1973. Abstaining members pointed out that they were not opposed to taking 
action per se, but that they did not agree that using military force should be part of the 
Resolution. In the statement following the vote, Germany argued that they saw great risks in 
using military force: “If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of 
being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region.” 16 
Similarly, Brazil was critical of the means that were employed to ensure the protection of the 
Libyan people. They argued that even though they were supportive of the Arab League’s call 
for “strong measures to stop the violence through a no-fly zone”, (…) “the text of resolution 
1973 (2011) contemplates measures that go far beyond that call.”17 Russia was similarly 
concerned that the Resolution included provisions that “could potentially open the door to 
large-scale military intervention.”18  
 
The initial implementation of the Resolution consisted mainly of air attacks on Libyan 
government positions that were most likely to target civilians. NATO attacked naval sites as 
well as tanks and other units engaged in combat, keeping the protection of civilians as the 
                                                          
15Security Council, 'Record of 6498th Security Council Meeting' 17 March 2011 7  
16Ibid.  
17Ibid.  
18Ibid.  
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primary objective. After a few weeks it became clear, however, that the government’s 
resistance was stronger than had been anticipated which led to NATO bombing a wider range 
of targets. When Gaddafi’s family compound was targeted, killing his youngest son and three 
of his grandchildren, Russia described the attack as “disproportionate use of force”. 19 It 
became questionable whether NATO’s increased efforts could still be considered necessary 
to protect civilians or whether the mission had changed to include regime change. The 
conflict in Libya finally came to an end in August 2011 with Gaddafi killed and his son as 
well his head of intelligence captured, currently awaiting trial for alleged crimes against 
humanity.  
 
The intervention in Libya was ground-breaking on a number of levels, but it also highlighted 
a number of problems with R2P in practice. The intervention was done with the primary aim 
to protect civilians and to stop massive human rights abuses from taking place. This changed, 
however, when NATO started expanding the targets it attacked in order to force Gaddafi out 
of power. This aim of regime change – that was seen by NATO leaders as necessary for 
achieving its aim of protecting civilians – became a major bone of contention and led to 
Libya being seen as the negative example of ‘how not to do it’.   A number of states that had 
been hesitant about the military intervention in the first place, argued that NATO had 
overstepped its mark and that R2P had been used a smokescreen for regime change. “Even 
the most ardent international advocates of R2P have acknowledged that the mandate was 
stretched to breaking point and maybe beyond it.”20 This ‘stretching’ can be seen as one of 
the reasons for the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the conflict in 
Syria. 
                                                          
19Security Council 'Record of 6528th Security Council Meeting' 4 May 2011   
20Spencer Zifcak 'The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria' (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 12  
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A lot of parallels have been drawn between the situation in Libya and the crisis that started 
unfolding in Syria in March 2011. Most importantly the fact that both situations involve 
massive human rights violations resulting from a popular uprising against the ruling elite and 
that there have been numerous calls for international action. 
 
IV. R2P, THE ICC AND SYRIA – UNDER THE LIBYAN SHADOW 
Following similar peaceful demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt as part of the Arab Spring, 
Syrian activists took to the streets in February 2011 to demand more economic prosperity, 
political freedom and civil liberties. In March 2011, the Syrian regime, led by President 
Bashar al-Assad, launched a violent crackdown on peaceful protestors after a group of 
children were arrested, detained and tortured because of painting anti-government graffiti on 
public buildings. Protests spread rapidly across the whole country and the reaction of the 
military forces became even more violent. According to the UN, more than 100,000 people 
have lost their lives to date and more than 6 million had to flee their homes. Throughout the 
uprising, the Syrian government has referred to the opposition as terrorists that are trying to 
destabilize the country. Opposition leaders counter that that was just the regime's way of 
justifying their attacks against civilians. 
 
Initial enthusiasm regarding the application of R2P and that the concept could be invoked in 
cases of serious human rights abuses were dampened with the onset of this crisis. Syria has 
been subject to Security Council debates a number of times and it is clear that the Security 
Council is at a deadlock due to a number of reasons. Even though Security Council members 
continuously express their deep concerns with regard to the deteriorating situation, it is very 
clear that different members of the Council have different emphases on what could (and 
15 
 
should) be done about the crisis. As Garwood-Gowers argues: “disagreements over Syria 
have centred on two key issues: first, how to interpret events on the ground, and second, how 
to respond to the violence.” 21  Western states have called for Assad to step aside and 
especially the UK, France and the US advocated early on some form of external intervention 
to stop the bloodshed and to protect civilians on the ground. The BRICS on the other hand 
placed a lot more emphasis on protecting Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, arguing 
that it was essentially a domestic matter and that no external pressure to change the regime 
should be applied.  
 
Geopolitical considerations make the situation very difficult; national interests of Council 
members are more directly affected by Syria than they were for instance in Libya. China and 
Russia are close allies of Syria and the country is also seen as being central for the whole 
region’s stability. Most importantly, however, it also became clear that Libya featured very 
heavily in considerations surrounding any resolution regarding Syria. On 4 October 2011, 
Russia for instance argued in a Security Council meeting that “The situation in Syria cannot 
be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience. The international 
community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on 
Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing 
the responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s “Unified Protector” model could 
happen in Syria.”22  
 
Libya and the political fall-out resulting from it has undermined the trust between Western 
and non-Western state when it comes to R2P. Libya is cited as a negative example that is 
                                                          
21Andrew Garwood-Gowers 610  
22Security Council, 'Record of 6627th Security Council Meeting' 4 October 2011 4  
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making Russia and China very reluctant to support action under the principle. A number of 
discussions in the Security Council clearly show that R2P itself is not in question, but that it 
is much rather a question of the means and also whose responsibility it is to protect civilians. 
The BRICS argue that it was Syria’s and they are concerned that any resolution that 
authorises intervention would just be a smokescreen for regime change.  South Africa, for 
instance, argued that “we have seen recently that Security Council resolutions have been 
abused, and that their Implementation has gone far beyond the mandate of what was 
intended.”23 Statements like these clearly show that the implementation of the R2P norm has 
been negatively affected by actions taken in Libya and that future agreements in similar crisis 
situations are difficult to achieve. As Gallagher and Ralph rightly argue: “Although the P3 
have solid grounds for claiming their intervention delivered a positive outcome in terms of 
the protection of civilians mandate there were legitimacy costs to the breakdown of 
international consensus; and crucially, this has had a negative effect on (…) the quality of 
international society’s performance in other R2P situations.”24  
 
4.1.Acknowledging the crisis - Resolutions 2118 and 2139 
Syria has been subject to numerous Security Council debates. The first resolution in relation 
to Syria that was passed unanimously came on 27 September 2013 in form of Resolution 
2118 (2013) that dealt with the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. This resolution 
followed a chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime that killed thousands of civilians 
and set a clear timeframe for the destruction of such weapons. Crucially, however, this 
resolution was not passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and did not allow for coercive 
measures. The Resolutions includes the notion that “those individuals responsible for the use 
                                                          
23Ibid.  
24Adrian Gallagher and Jason G. Ralph 'Legitimacy faultlines in international society: The Responsibility to 
Protect and Prosecute After Libya' (2014) FirstView Review of International Studies 19  
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of chemical weapons (…) should be held accountable.” In statements following the vote, the 
majority of states emphasised such a need for accountability and ending impunity of those 
suspected of committing human rights abuses and some (for instance Luxembourg and 
Australia) even called for the situation to be referred to the ICC. 
 
On 22 February 2014, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139, the first 
resolution that explicitly dealt with the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The text of the resolution 
made it very clear that violence from all sides (i.e. the government as well as the opposition) 
was unacceptable and needed to stop. The resolution also “stresses that some of the violations 
[of obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law] may 
amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Furthermore, it “stresses the need to end 
impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human 
rights, and reaffirms that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such 
violations and abuses in Syria must be brought to justice.” These two provisions in the 
resolution are important because they may open the way for prosecution on an international 
level should Syria fail to investigate these crimes itself. By recalling the need for 
accountability and by also already categorising acts as possible war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (i.e. ICC crimes), an environment that allows for future ICC action is created. ICC 
action is not excluded and arguably, even a first step towards possible action is taken. This 
shows that states in the Security Council agree on the established Responsibility to Prosecute 
to hold individuals accountable for serious violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law.  
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Resolution 2139 makes direct mention of R2P, but the Resolution states that the primary 
responsibility to protect civilians lies with Syria; ostensibly opening the way for international 
action should this responsibility not be met. In statements after the vote, Australia, for 
instance argued that “the resolution is binding on all of us. Council members and the wider 
United Nation membership must themselves do what they can to pressure the Syrian 
authorities and the opposition groups to implement it. The resolution has made very clear the 
Council’s expectations that its demands will be met and that there will be consequences for 
non-compliance.” 25  France similarly argued that additional measures in case of non-
compliance may follow. The US stated that “the resolution is important for two reasons. It 
has a clear demand for specific and concrete actions, and it is a commitment to act in the 
event of non-compliance.”26  
 
Russia agreed to the Resolution because it saw that many of its concerns had been taken into 
consideration in drafting the resolution and it therefore perceived it to be more balanced. It 
again criticised attempts of abusing R2P for other political ends in this context, however, by 
stating that  “The Security Council decided relatively recently to consider the humanitarian 
situation in Syria, and only after it became clear that attempts to use the deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation to effect regime change were unsuccessful.”27  
 
The Resolution included clear demands for all parties involved in the Syrian conflict and 
asked the Secretary-General to report on the situation. He did so on 24 March 2014, arguing 
that he is “extremely concerned at the continuing violations of international humanitarian and 
                                                          
25Security Council, 'Record of 7116th Security Council Meeting ' 22 February 2014 4  
26Ibid.  
27Ibid.  
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human rights law in the Syrian Arab Republic and the culture of impunity that has developed. 
All sides in the conflict must adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law.”28 It 
has become clear that military action is very unlikely in Syria, but the possibility of judicial 
intervention is not fully discarded. States agree that R2P and the Responsibility to Prosecute 
as a principles are given but the question is again about the means – what can be done to 
fulfil those responsibilities?  
 
4.2. The Responsibility to Prosecute and calls for ICC referral 
There have been numerous calls for the situation on Syria to be referred to the ICC from a 
number of different sources. A large number of states in Security Council meetings 
mentioned the ICC as a possible (and suitable) instrument to deal with the crisis and to hold 
perpetrators to justice. Language used in different resolutions that label the crimes committed 
as ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ is a first step towards possible ICC action 
because they are already categorised in terms of crimes the ICC has jurisdiction over. All 
resolutions also stress the importance of accountability as well as the fact that the first 
responsibility to act lies with Syria, which is in line with the ICC’s complementarity 
principle. In January 2013, almost 60 states called on the Security Council in an open letter to 
refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. 
 
Similar calls for ICC referral also came from a number of other sources: The Independent 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria noted in its 4th report in February 2013, that the ICC was an 
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“appropriate institution for the fight against impunity to Syria.”29 And similarly in its 7th 
Report in February 2014, the Commission added a number of names to a list of Syrian and 
military units suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 
ongoing conflict. It also urged the Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC through 
its Chapter VII powers.30   
 
The European Parliament similarly issued a resolution in which it “reiterates its calls for the 
Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court for a 
formal investigation.”31 The High Commissioner for Human Rights also repeatedly called for 
the situation to be referred to ICC.  In a briefing to the General Assembly on 25 February 
2014, Navi Pillay said that despite peace talks to resolve the crisis, the violence in Syria 
continued with war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations 
committed by all parties to the conflict. She said: “The perpetrators of these appalling crimes 
act in defiance of law and the international community without fear of accountability. 
Referral to justice is imperative for future hopes of peace. Today, I repeat again my call to the 
Security Council to refer the Syrian crisis to the International Criminal Court.”32   
 
There seems to be an established ‘Responsibility to Prosecute’ as all Resolutions surrounding 
Syria and Libya unquestionably call for perpetrators to be held to account and justice to be 
brought to victims. There is no consensus on how this should be done, but there seems to be a 
consensus that it has to be done.  As the Chair of the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry stated on 18 March 2014: “We do not lack information on crimes or perpetrators. 
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What we lack is a means by which to achieve justice and accountability. In resolution 2139, 
the Security Council unanimously stressed the need to end impunity for violations of 
international law and reaffirmed “that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible 
for such violations and abuses in Syria must be brought to justice.” It is for the Security 
Council to make this pursuit of justice possible.”33  
 
There are clear division between Council members on the tension between peace and justice 
in this context. Some argue that justice should not be pursued if peace has not been 
established in Syria and that pursuing justice would actually harm the peace process. Other 
say that the two go hand in hand and that justice is a first step towards peace. And even others 
argue that because there is no peace process in Syria, it cannot be harmed by pursuing justice.  
 
These divisions also became evident during the debates following another draft resolution on 
Syria on 22 May 2014. Sixty-five states submitted a resolution to the Security Council, 
proposing to refer the situation of Syria to the ICC. The resolution was (not surprisingly) 
vetoed by Russia and China that were both concerned about the possibility of using such a 
resolution as pretext for armed intervention with the ultimate aim of regime change. Any 
possible ICC action is dependent on state cooperation which includes the apprehension of 
suspects, by force if necessary. Russia stood firm in its view that peace had to come before 
justice and also that the Libyan example had shown that referrals to the ICC “did not help 
resolve the crisis, but instead added fuel to the flames of the conflict.”34 Russia argued that 
Syrians themselves were responsible for settling the crisis and that the Geneva Communique 
continued to remain at the core of peace efforts. China was similarly concerned that ICC 
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intervention would hamper peace negotiations.35 It furthermore stated its principled position 
against ICC intervention, favouring prosecutions in domestic contexts.  
 
The draft resolution contained a number of references to R2P, such as Australia’s statement 
that “The Security Council has a responsibility to protect, a responsibility mandated by all 
our leaders at their World Summit in 2005, and to prevent mass atrocities where we can.”36 
Furthermore, “The Council’s roles was specifically recognized in the Rome Statute, because 
accountability is central to protection and to the Council’s fundamental responsibilities 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” Australia favours justice 
before peace, but also argued that the two are inextricably linked. Rwanda similarly stated 
that the Security Council’s responsibility for international peace and security “includes the 
responsibility to protect and the obligation of (sic) hold accountable the perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes.”37  
 
4.3. Selective justice 
Even though a great number of states decided to vote in favour of the 22 May resolution, the 
draft was not without its critics. Criticisms related to the way the resolution exempted non-
states parties from the ICC’s jurisdiction, thereby applying a very selective approach to what 
should be impartial and equal justice. This again shows the difficulties and problems attached 
to the ICC being used as a political tool by the Security Council. Such selectivity might be 
politically necessary to gather enough support for the resolution, but it is detrimental to the 
ICC’s perceived impartiality and legitimacy. These kinds of exemptions seem to become 
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common norm in Security Council referrals as the resolutions that referred the situations in 
Darfur and Libya similarly exclude all non-states parties except the ones in question. It is 
clear that such selectivity is problematic for the ICC that aims to be an impartial and fair 
body.38  This point was also made by a number of states following debates after the vote on 
the 22 May resolution. First and foremost, Argentina made a number of critical arguments 
against such selectivity, arguing that this harms the ICC: “Argentina decided not to be a 
sponsor of the initiative, because it was also our objective to preserve the integrity of the 
Statute, which requires referrals to the Council to be formulated in the appropriate terms so as 
not to undermine the legal foundations of the Rome Statute itself or the Court’s validity and 
effectiveness.”39 (Record of 7116th Security Council Meeting 2014, p. 10) It criticised that 
the resolution asked states to “accept as normal the exercise of selective justice” and that 
“there seems to be an attempt to make us believe that undermining the integrity of legal 
instruments in no way hinders the objective of achieving justice.”40 Argentina called the 
provision of deferring all costs resulting from an ICC referral to the ICC as “blatantly 
unfair”.41 Similarly Chad argued that “While voting in favour in principle, Chad regrets that 
the draft resolution (…) provides for the discretionary treatment of a category of State 
nationals with respect to the same crime. However, such exemptions (…) undermine the 
principle of settling scores and the ideal of independent and credible international criminal 
justice for all, without exception, for the most serious crimes.”42  
 
Bosco argues that such double standards are part of global governance and that the ICC 
simply reflects them, rather than aiming to alter them. He concludes that “the court’s first 
                                                          
38It is even debateable whether such exemptions are legal or workable in practice. See for instance Robert Cryer 
'Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice' (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law  
39Security Council 10  
40Ibid.  
41Ibid.  
42Ibid.  
24 
 
decade suggests that it may be possible to design international institutions around power – but 
not to escape it.”43 Even if this may be the case, it still raises further questions about the 
appropriateness of the Security Council as the body that can take decisions regarding the 
ICC. As Gallagher & Ralph observe, three of the P5 are not states parties to the ICC and there 
is no requirement that non-permanent members be states parties.44  This raises the question of 
whether the Security Council is even the most appropriate body to utilise the ICC if its 
permanent members are not states parties and therefore not under the Court’s jurisdiction 
themselves.45  
 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ICC AND ITS LEGITIMACY STATUS  
There are two main issues that are worth highlighting in the context of the present analysis. 
The first relates to the nature of criminal justice more generally – i.e. the pursuit of 
international justice during an ongoing conflict and the second to the relationship between the 
ICC and the Security Council – i.e. the use of the ICC as a political tool. 
 
5.1. The Nature of Criminal Justice 
The first issue related to ICC action in the midst of an ongoing conflict is a more general one 
that lies in the nature of criminal justice itself. As Mills rightly argues: “Criminal justice is, 
by its very nature, retrospective, but the ICC is embedded within contemporary global 
political realities and has been called to perform a prospective function – deterrence. It has 
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also been deployed in the midst of conflict to perform a conflict management role or to 
induce leaders to stop their atrocities or force them to step down.”46 Resolution 1970 that 
referred Libya to the ICC clearly showed that the ICC was used in that particular instance in 
the middle of a conflict with the aim of stopping ongoing violence.  
 
There has been an overall shift in R2P’s focus: it was primarily meant to be a humanitarian 
doctrine, focussing on the prevention of human rights abuses, but it has become more of a 
conflict resolution tool. R2P is present-looking or prospective, the ICC on the other hand is 
retrospective but with a prospective function of deterrence as well as a conflict management 
function. The difficulty lies in determining what functions can actually be fulfilled by an 
international institution in times of an ongoing crisis. This links to the debate of peace versus 
justice and the question whether justice can be achieved before peace has been established? 
There are fears that if a situation is referred to the ICC, this can then lead to pressure for 
military action to enforce possible arrest warrants (especially Russia is concerned that referral 
will lead to another resolution authorising military action).  As Mills rightly points out, “if the 
ICC is to be used in the middle of conflict, it requires further support from the Security 
Council and other actors.”47 It is therefore very difficult (if not impossible) to discuss ICC 
action (judicial intervention) without also having to consider some form of military action to 
support it. 
 
The ICC is dependent on state cooperation to fulfil its mandate (including apprehending 
suspects) which might involve the need to use military force. Particularly Russia and China 
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are opposed to possible military action that might follow a resolution that refers the situation 
in Syria to the ICC. They both fear that they might be ‘dragged’ into military intervention 
should they agree to ICC action. Tis was the case in Libya where Resolution 1970 referred 
the situation to the ICC and Resolution 1973 that followed then authorized military action to 
help enforce the former. Furthermore, on the question of whether justice could (and should) 
be pursued before peace has been established, Stahn rightly argues that the problem in Syria 
lies in “the inherent tension between the implementation of the disarmament regime under 
Resolution 2118 (2013) and investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed by the 
Assad regime before a transfer of political power. The destruction of Syrian chemical 
weapons requires information, support and cooperation by the Syrian government. (…) The 
issuance of arrest warrants would complicate this process.”48 It is obvious that peace needs 
cooperation and arrest warrants resulting from possible ICC action would be harmful in the 
process. 
 
5.2. Relationship between the ICC and the Security Council 
The second issue that the Libya and Syria conflicts clearly highlight is the fact that the ICC 
can be (and is being) used as a political tool in the Security Council. It is generally agreed 
that the ICC is part of the toolkit when considering action under the R2P umbrella, but: this 
politicises the ICC which is – at least on paper - meant to be an impartial and neutral body 
and it becomes an extension of the Security Council which is by its very nature a deeply 
political body.  Being linked to R2P in Security Council deliberations can be detrimental to 
the ICC’s perceived legitimacy as the R2P concept in itself has become controversial after 
Libya. Russia and China are objecting to any measures that include R2P language because of 
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the negative experiences with Libya. They do not seem to explicitly object ICC action, but 
their opposition is primarily against R2P and how the concept had been distorted during the 
Libya conflict. The Resolution that failed to be adopted on 22 May 2014 showed that the 
main concern of a possible ICC referral centres on the possibility of this then being a first 
step towards regime change by force. This could be seen by Russia, for instance, arguing that 
ICC referral was just a ‘pretext for armed intervention’.  
 
A number of different Security Council Resolutions related to Syria recall the need to hold 
individuals to account for their actions. The Resolutions reaffirm “that those who have 
committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria must be 
brought to justice.” It is therefore clear that the overall concept of a Responsibility to 
Prosecute is not in question, but that it still needs to be decided how it can be done. 
Resolution 2118 “expresses its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use 
of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable.” And 
similarly, Resolution 2139 (2014) stresses “the need to end impunity for violations of 
international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights.” The same 
resolutions also include language that makes international prosecutions possible by claiming 
that some of the acts committed may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
China and Russia did not veto these resolutions and it is therefore clear that agreement exists 
between states in the international society that these kind of crimes that are taking place 
cannot go unpunished. The difference lies in the approach of how to achieve justice – Russia 
and China have historically been against interventionist politics and emphasise state 
sovereignty and the state’s own responsibility to act.  
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Using the ICC as a tool at the disposal of the Security Council as a political body raises the 
question of the context in which ICC has been given jurisdiction. The Security Council has 
the right (within existing UN Charter provisions) to determine a threat to international peace 
and security and decide on appropriate action, but this is a political decision, not a judicial 
one. The ICC was intended to be largely independent from the UN and the Security Council, 
but if it is being used as a tool by the Security Council, this perception of independence is lost 
and it ultimately undermines the Court’s credibility and legitimacy.  
 
In addition, the fact that the adopted Security Council resolutions exempt non-states parties 
from the Court’s jurisdiction is very problematic for the selectivity these resolutions exercise. 
As Louise Arbour49 rightly argues, referrals in the cases of Libya and Darfur have done little 
to enhance the standing and credibility of the Court and have also contributed very little to 
peace and reconciliation in the countries. She argues that even though such referrals enhance 
the reach of accountability, they do so at a cost that is very difficult to bear for an 
international justice mechanism. Such selectivity jeopardises one of the rule of laws basic 
premises of ‘equality before the law’. As Christian Wenaweser, then President of the ICC’s 
Assembly of States Parties, pointed out in 2011 that “in the future, we … no longer have to 
look at referrals from the point of view of acceptance of the Court … but rather from the best 
interest of international criminal justice. This means in concrete terms a genuine commitment 
to ensure justice is done, by providing the necessary diplomatic and financial support.”50 In 
an interview with David Bosco “Wenaweser was more pointed, “Is the Security Council 
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genuinely committed to making sure that there is no impunity or is this about something 
else?” That “something else” was political control.”51  
 
Security Council referrals politicise the Court and exempting certain states incorporates 
double standards that are not easily reconcilable with the Court and its aim of dispensing 
impartial justice. By not applying fair principles, applicable to all in equal measures, the 
ICC’s perceived legitimacy decreases. There is also a normative argument to be made in that 
all states should be required to cooperate and be answerable to the ICC in cases of Security 
Council referral because in such cases, the ICC is acting for the UN as a whole i.e. in the 
name and interest if all states.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The ICC is more than just a tool for the Security Council, however, and being side-lined by 
the UN does not mean that it is becoming less important in its overall endeavour. As could be 
seen from the recent crisis in the Ukraine, where the state accepted ICC jurisdiction on an ad 
hoc basis, the ICC is very much alive and kicking. It still has other obstacles it needs to deal 
with and overcome (such as the recent AU ‘backlash’ against the ICC). Too close ties with 
the Security Council are not desirable for the ICC because politicisation leads the ICC away 
from its initial aim: that of impartial justice.  
 
The ICC can benefit from being associated with R2P especially when it comes to the first 
priority of ‘prevention’. Holding individuals to account for crimes is designed to have a 
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deterrence effect, preventing future crimes from happening. This association is becoming less 
beneficial, however, if it is then linked to military intervention based on Chapter VII action. 
The ICC needs assistance from states for its enforcement – with force if necessary – which 
again highlights problems attached to the Security Council referring cases. The basic 
principle of a Responsibility to Prosecute is not challenged – the question is one of how, not 
whether and it is becoming increasingly clear that Security Council referral is not the best 
way forward. 
